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MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain
of Title on Real Property Owners
David E. Woolley* and Lisa D. Herzog**
I. INTRODUCTION
Many problems with the Mortgage Electronic Registry System
(“MERS”) and the home loan securitization process have been reported in
print media, in movies, on television and in academic journals. MERS now
keeps electronic records on about half of the home mortgages in the United
States.1 Courts have ruled against MERS’ standing to foreclose and have
criticized the MERS model as being flawed, wholly inaccurate and not
allowing homeowners to fight foreclosures because it shields the true
owner of a mortgage in public records.2 States Attorneys’ General and
* David E. Woolley is the principal, owner and founder of both Harbinger Analytics Group and D.
Woolley & Associates. Mr. Woolley is a California Licensed Land Surveyor and Certified Fraud
Examiner with over twenty-four years of experience. At Harbinger Analytics, Mr. Woolley specializes
in the investigation of commercial real property boundary disputes, land survey fraud, land title
insurance fraud and their cumulative effects on mortgage loans. Mr. Woolley is also an experienced
expert witness, testifying in California and federal courts in a variety of land title, boundary dispute, and
other civil litigation matters.
At Harbinger Analytics, Mr. Woolley provides land title survey auditing and quality control
programming, fraud investigation, and technical report production pertaining to land survey and land
title fraud. Harbinger Analytics Group also provides litigation support services in the form of expert
witness opinions regarding standard of care, professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation and
breach of representations and warranties.
** Lisa D. Herzog is a California Licensed Attorney with over fourteen years of professional legal
experience in the fields of business and real property litigation, employment litigation, discrimination
litigation, and business transactions and agreements. Ms. Herzog is an adjunct professor for Pepperdine
University Graziadio School of Business and Management in Malibu, California. She received a B.A.
in Communcations and Psychology from Michigan State Unversity, a Masters in Labor and Industrial
Relations from Michigan State University, and her J.D. from Pepperdine University School of Law.
Ms. Herzog also serves as a writer, researcher, and editor for Harbinger Analytics Group where
she specializes in preparing papers for publication. She assists David Woolley in compiling client
reports and findings.
1. Marian Wang, Backgrounder: A Closer Look at MERS, the Industry’s Controversial Mortgage
Clearinghouse, PROPUBLICA (March 7, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/backgrounder-acloser-look-at-mers-the-industrys-controversial-mortgage-cle.
2. See In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that MERS lacked the legal
standing to transfer the ownership of mortgages on behalf of banks). In his opinion, Judge Robert E.
Grossman stated “This court does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with
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federal bank regulators3 are investigating MERS practices including
fraudulently robo-signing (by way of servicers) and backdating missing
documents. A few County Registrars of Deeds are claiming that they are
owed millions of dollars in lost revenue from mortgage assignment
transfers that were not recorded because MERS was listed as the mortgagee
in public land records.4
What none of these “experts,” reporters, or courts are analyzing (in
specific terms) is the destructive effect that the MERS system will have on
400 years of recorded property rights in the United States. Most articles
mention the lost chain of title but stop short of explaining what this means,
or how it will affect homeowners with or without mortgages in the MERS
system. These problems deal with ramifications “on the ground” (literally)
for determining (1) property boundaries (senior and junior property rights)
and (2) proof of ownership in order to obtain title insurance and financing.
Most individuals reasonably assume the limits of their title agree with those
delineated by improvements (i.e., fences), however, this may not be true.
Because MERS is utilized for transferring title and these transfers are
not publicly recorded (thereby imparting constructive notice), MERS does
not comply with race (first in time) or (constructive or actual) notice5
statutes and, therefore, senior/junior property rights cannot be determined
when a discrepancy arises in property boundaries lines. Consider the
following:
 What happens if the chain of title cannot be determined because
there are no accurate and publicly recorded deeds/title documents
showing chain of title to determine senior and junior rights
designations for boundary determinations between neighbors?
 What happens when you destroy the adjoining property rights and
records of homeowners who never defaulted on their mortgages
fifty percent of all residential mortgages in the country, that is reason enough for this court to turn a
blind eye to the fact that this process does not comply with the law.”
3. Including the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Wang, supra note 1. See also Nick
Timiraos, Critical Signs in Foreclosure Talks, WALL STREET J., Apr. 12, 2011 (giving status of
settlement with states’ attorneys general, and federal regulators and lenders).
4. See Austin Kilgore, Recorder Wants to Close Account at Bank of America to Protest MERS,
NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS, (April 11, 2011), at 8, available at http://www.nationalmortgagenews.
com/on_features/recorder-wants-to-close-bofa-account-1024417-1.html?site=default_tech
(regarding
Registrar of Deeds in South Essex District of Massachusetts). “MERS saved banks time and money by
providing a private, electronic alternative to the public system used by local government recorders. By
using the MERS registry, they largely avoided the recording fees.” Wang, supra note 1.
5. For the purposes of this article, no distinction is made between race, notice, and race/notice.
Race/notice is meant to encompass all designations.
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are now forced to litigate boundary disputes and property rights?
 Why did the title insurance companies repeatedly refuse to
underwrite foreclosures if land title was stable?6
These are the exact problems that MERS has created—the bigger
problems that no one has explained—the elephant in the room. Thanks to
MERS’ failure to accurately complete and/or publically record property
conveyances in the frenzy of banks securitizing home loans and in
subsequent foreclosure actions,7 neighbors to a foreclosed property (with a
sequential conveyance8) as well as the foreclosed property itself will have
unclear boundaries on the ground and clouded/unmarketable titles making
it difficult, if not impossible, for these homeowners to sell their properties
and for subsequent purchasers to obtain title insurance and financing on
that property. We will not be able to determine senior (superior) and junior
(inferior) property rights designations because no one will know which
parcels were conveyed first in time and to whom.
The MERS system has created an environment in which tens of
thousands of titles have been lost or diluted in a sea of MERS transactions
and may take a hundred years to fix, while forcing innocent adjacent
homeowners to litigate in order to reclaim their property rights. This article
will: (1) summarize the history of how land was surveyed and divided in
the Western United States, (2) explain how junior and senior property
rights are determined in the face of a boundary dispute, (3) briefly discuss
the robo-signer scandal, the problem with the MERS system and recent
court cases involving MERS, (4) describe exactly how MERS has
destroyed or severely diluted chains of title for boundary disputes between
foreclosed properties’ subsequent owners and all of their neighbors, (5)

6. At one point in October 2010, Old Republic was reportedly refusing to write title policies for
some foreclosures altogether. Stephanie Armour, Old Republic To Stop Writing Policies For Some
Foreclosures, USA TODAY, October 2, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/201010-02-old-republic-foreclosures_N.htm.
7. “For banks, the local government recorders weren’t speedy enough especially as the mortgage
industry moved into the business of securitization, or bundling and selling mortgages.” Wang, supra
note 1.
8. A sequential conveyance occurs when:
a portion of a tract of land is sold, two or more parcels are created, a new parcel and the
remainder parent parcel. Because the new parcel must receive all of the land described, it is
called the senior deed, and the remainder, at the time of conveyance, becomes the junior
deed. Sequential conveyances are those written deeds in which junior and senior rights exist
between two adjoining parcels. In general, sequential conveyances came into being because
of a lapse of time between successive conveyance instruments.
BROWN, CURTIS M., WALTER G. ROBILLARD, DONALD A. WILSON, BROWN’S BOUNDARY CONTROL
AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES § 11.2 (6th ed. 2009).
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analyze the resulting difficulty these subsequent homeowners and their
neighbors will experience when attempting to sell their properties (with
clouded titles) when purchasers will not be able to obtain title insurance
(without seller indemnity) and financing.
II. LAND DIVISION AND CHAIN OF TITLE IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. A BRIEF HISTORY LESSON
The concept of land title is uniquely American. Historically, Native
Americans had no concept of written title because they did not believe that
any person could “own” land. European settlers changed this belief by
imposing the concept of land ownership by individual people on the New
World of America.9 Today, the concept of stable individual “land
ownership” separates America from most of the rest of the world. In the
United States, the following key concepts are true: (1) real property law
rights and defenses all tie to accurate and publically recorded chain of title
and property ownership records at the county level, (2) accurate publically
recorded chain of title documents are critical in determining land
ownership (senior and junior property rights) avoiding the need for
litigation, (3) there are no federal laws governing private property rights.
Therefore, a federal system of title (electronic or otherwise) is not feasible,
(4) the stability of the land title is paramount in preserving land ownership
and maintaining civil harmony, and (5) real property is a secure and
valuable investment.
In the Western States, land division began with the Louisiana
Purchase of 1803. According to this statute and pursuant to the Land Act of
1805, land was to be surveyed west of the Mississippi River all the way to
California (excluding Texas at that time).10 Government Land Office
(“GLO”) surveyors, beginning in Ohio, were tasked with subdividing land
into one square mile sections—each containing 640 acres.11 Nevertheless,
no two parcels are exactly the same when measured on the ground due to
rough terrain, bad weather, and antiquated instruments and, sometimes,
surveyors’ failure to survey at all. These subdivided 640 acres varied from
a few inches to several hundred feet. Like snowflakes, each 640-acre
section was different and these discrepancies remain today.
As early as 1891, the California legislature recognized that land

9. BROWN, ROBILLARD, AND WILSON, supra note 8, at § 1.2.
10. Id. at § 6.
11. Id.
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subdivided by way of a written description was prone to title defects, gaps,
gores and overlaps which resulted in expensive litigation. At that time,
California (and most other states) enacted laws that required a land
surveyor to file a public record each time one of these property lines was
established by a surveyor. These laws were intended to make the property
line determinations available to the public, thus avoiding litigation to
resolve disputes associated with unfiled records or unclear boundaries.
Modern day surveyors are still discovering discrepancies in the course
of conducting boundary surveys; therefore, it is easy to see why material
discrepancies in title still arise. The only way to resolve these boundary
discrepancies, absent litigation, is by examination of the chain of title to
determine senior and junior property rights and divide the land according to
established legal principles.
B. THE SURVEYOR’S ROLE – DETERMINING SENIOR AND JUNIOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SEQUENTIAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCES
As a practical matter, the law (and surveyors) deals with boundary
discrepancies discovered by surveys, without the need for litigation, by
examining the chain of title (found in publically recorded documents and
grantor/grantee indexes) back to the original owner and grantor to
determine senior and junior rights for sequential conveyances. The real
property’s history of conveyances from one owner to another is called a
“chain of title.” Chain of title is specifically defined as the “record of
successive conveyances, or other forms of alienation, affecting a particular
parcel of land, arranged consecutively, from the government or original
source of title down to the present holder.”12
Because only evidence of ownership is recorded in these public
records, to prove ownership of a particular parcel, a property owner must
show a continuous title record back to the first conveyance by the original
owner/grantor that described the parcel. The compilation of all title
ownership is known as the chain of title or chain of record.13 When a
portion of a tract of land is sold, two or more parcels are created including
a “new parcel” and the “remainder” of the parent parcel.14 A parcel is
apportioned according to well-settled principles found in race/notice
statutes. Because the “new parcel” must receive all the land described, it is
called the “senior deed” (or “senior parcel”, “senior rights”) and at the time
of conveyance the “remainder” becomes the “junior deed” (or “junior

12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 229 (6th ed. 1990).
13. BROWN, ROBILLARD, AND WILSON, supra note 8, at 457.
14. Id. at 301.
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parcel,” “junior rights”).15 “Sequential conveyances” are those written
deeds in which junior and senior rights exist between adjoining parcels.16
Stated another way, the first (in time) conveyance by deed is called the
senior conveyance. The next (in time) conveyance by deed is called the
junior conveyance. Four well established principles in law and in
surveying that determine senior and junior property rights are stated as
follows:
(1) “As between private parties in a land dispute, a senior right is
superior to a junior right;”17
(2) “As between private parties, a junior grant, in conflict with a
senior grant, yields to the senior grant;”18
(3) A grantor cannot convey what he does not own;19 and
(4) Between equal equities, the first in order of time shall prevail.20
These principals establish the rights of the parties when excesses or,
more importantly, when deficiencies in the amount of land conveyed to two
parties occurs. The surveyor (and the courts) study the chain of title from
recorded public deeds/title documents to determine senior and junior rights
designations based on the portion of the parcel that was conveyed first in
time (pursuant to race/notice statutes) by the original grantor. Based on
existing case law and statutory authority, this boundary determination is
made clearly and accurately without the need for litigation as to the
location of the property lines.
Diagram A on the following page shows the importance of a clear
chain of title.

15. BROWN, ROBILLARD, AND WILSON, supra note 8, at 301.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 297.
18. Id. at 303.
19. Caselli v. Messina, 567 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973-74 (App. Div. 1990).
20. Maxims of Equity, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxims_of_equity (last updated
Dec. 5, 2011) (citing Richard Edwards, Nigel Stockwell (Pearson Education, 2005) Trusts and Equity,
pg. 34).
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Diagram A
Normal Conveyance (Non-MERS)
Original
Grantor A

A believes he
owns 100 feet
but he really
owns 95 feet.

A conveys East
50 feet to B in
1960. Sale is
recorded and
traceable in
grantor/grantee
index.
A
Remainder

A conveys West
50 feet to C in
1970 (but A only
has 45 feet left to
convey). C thinks
he owns West 50
feet. The
conveyance from
A to C is recorded
and traceable in
grantor/grantee
index.

B
East 50 feet
(1960)
B and C get
into
boundary
dispute and
have survey
done that
determines
original
parcel
owned by A
was only 95
feet, not 100
feet.

C
Remainder
(1970)

B
East 50 feet
(1960)
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1. B and C now have a problem. How is A’s original parcel divided?
2. The division between B and C is determined by examining the
chain of title (found in the publicly recorded documents and the
grantor/grantee indexes) back the original grantor A.
3. B acquired the East 50 feet from A in 1960 leaving A with 45 feet.
4. C acquired the West 50 feet from A in 1970, however, A only had
45 feet left to convey.
5. Because B acquired his 50 feet first in time (superior) he keeps 50
feet and C keeps the remaining 45 feet (junior).
6. C’s deed is reformed to reflect 45 feet and this document is
recorded.
This basic example shows the importance of a clear chain of title in
determining property rights in sequential conveyances, particularly when
dealing with a previously flawed survey or an ambiguous conveyance. In
the event that the chain of title cannot be recovered, owners will be forced
to litigate boundaries because they will not be able to determine the senior
rights—the exact problem created by MERS. See Diagram B below.
III. ROBO-SIGNER MORTGAGE FRAUD
One year ago, the American public was unfamiliar with the term
“robo-signer” describing loan processors and attorneys signing as many as
10,000 foreclosure documents a month (like robots) without reviewing the
documents’ contents.21 Many lenders, including Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, turned to law firms (“foreclosure mills”) that specialized in quick
processing of thousands of foreclosures for banks.22 A foreclosure mill is
created in the following scenario:
A loan is securitized through MERS (wherein MERS is presumably
the mortgagee holding land title and is also named as the nominee by the
promissory note holder). At this point, the promissory note and the
mortgage are separated. The promissory note is then pooled with other

21. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Under Piles of Paperwork, a Foreclosure System in
Chaos, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2010, http/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/09/22/AR2010092206146.html.
22. Stephanie Armour & Thomas Frank, Ex-worker: Florida Law Firm Ran “Foreclosure Mill”,
USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-10-18-witnessforeclosure-documents_N.html.
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promissory notes, repackaged, resold and haphazardly tracked (or not
tracked at all) through the private MERS system. Nevertheless, this
promissory note is not publically recorded and oftentimes is lost or
misplaced.
Subsequently, when a property goes into default, the
foreclosing party must prove ownership (conveying standing) to foreclose.
This becomes a problem. The last promissory note assignee, (who may or
may not possess the promissory note) claims ownership. Meanwhile, the
land title mortgage may be held by MERS. 23
Banks have subsequently argued, with limited success, that even
though separated, the mortgage actually follows the note. It is the marriage
of the promissory note (often times lost or nonexistent) and the mortgage
(after lost or nonexistent assignments) that was the incentive for robosigner fraud. Using robo-signers to falsify and recreate these previously
lost or nonexistent documents was the remedy created by the servicers—
resulting in fraud, forgery and falsification of legal documents. The irony
of the foreclosure mills and robo-signers is that at any given bank, front
line bank teller requires multiple forms of identification, thumb prints and
signature verifications in order for a customer to cash a check while the
same banks use robo-signers to create tens of thousands of forgeries (or
their latest preferred term of “surrogate signatures”).24
This conduct at foreclosure mills reached fraudulent levels and caused
the fifty states attorneys general to convene a committee (headed by Tom
Miller, Attorney General of Iowa) to investigate this fraudulent activity by
mortgage servicers.25 Bank executives and states’ attorneys general came
up with initial settlement terms in March, 2011 with a price tag of $20
billion and wide ranging releases of liability.26 Preliminary agreement
terms for any settlement between the attorneys general and large banks
have been deeply criticized.27 New York Attorney General Eric T.
Schneiderman is one of a hand full of attorneys general not willing to

23. See Diagram B infra.
24. Christine Stapleton, Surrogate Signers Signed Countless Foreclosure Documents With
Someone Else’s Name, WALL STREET MAIN STREET (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.wallstreetmainstreet.
com/2011/04/surrogate-signers-signed-countless.html.
25. Lorraine Woellert, Dakin Campbell & Carter Dougherty, Mortgage Servicers Said To Agree to
Fix Foreclosure Procedures, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0405/mortgage-servicers-said-to-agree-to-fix-foreclosure-procedures.html. See also Dave Clarke, Update
1 – Iowa AG Looks To Foreclosure Deal Within 2 Months, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/07/financial-regulation-servicing-idUSN0712043720110307.
26. Gretchen Morgenson, The Banks Still Want a Waiver, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2011,
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/business/bank-settlement-in-mortgage-mess-may-hinge-on-mers.html.
27. Gretchen Morgenson, Attorney General of N.Y. Is Said to Face Pressure on Bank Foreclosure
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/business/schneiderman-is-said-toface-pressure-to-back-bank-deal.html?pagewanted=all.
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support the proposed settlement.28 Nevertheless, high level government
officials have pressured Schneiderman to agree to the proposed
settlement.29 Most recently, when Schneiderman refused to fall in line, he
was kicked off of the fifty-state task force.30 Subsequently, John O’Brien,
Registry of Deeds for Southern Essex County, Massachusetts, and an
outspoken opponent of MERS, called for Tom Miller to step down as task
force chairperson.31
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley stated that she
would not sign on to any deal that would release the banks from liability
for MERS practices and Attorneys General from Delaware, Minnesota,
Kentucky and Nevada joined New York’s Scheiderman in believing that
the negotiations were absolving banks of too much liability.32
More recently, California’s Attorney General Kamala Harris broke
away from the fifty state mortgage settlement.33 Looming issues regarding
any settlement between the attorneys general committee and banks relate to
potential liability stemming from MERS.34 Harris stated that she pulled out
of the talks because the pending deal was “inadequate for California
homeowners” and gives bank officials too much legal immunity.35 The
departure of California (a large state in terms of population, foreclosure
exposure and electoral college) along with the other states that have
abandoned the settlement talks means that any settlement between
remaining states has limited practical meaning or credibility.36 David
Pelligrinelli, president of AFX Title, a title research company, stated that
MERS contributed to the problem of thousands of mortgages lacking a

28. Morgenson, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. Richard Zombeck, John O’Brien MA Registry of Deeds: AG Tom Miller Should Step Down,
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 2, 2011, www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-zombeck/john-obrien-ma-registryo_b_935417.html.
31. Id.
32. Jon Prior, Iowa AG: Banks May Face Criminal Liability After Robo-Signing Settlement,
HOUSINGWIRE.COM (Sept. 2, 2011), www.housingwire.com/2011/09/02/iowa-ag-banks-may-facecriminal-liability-after-robo-signing-settlement. See also Letter from Lori Swanson, Attorney General
of Minnesota, to Tom Miller, Iowa Attorney General, (Sept. 9, 2011) available at http://static1.
firedoglake.com/37/files/2011/09/Document.pdf (stating that any settlement between government
regulators and the mortgage industry should have “teeth” and hold “banks accountable for their
wrongful conduct, enjoining future unlawful activity, and helping injured homeowners”). See also
Yves Smith, Game Over: California Attorney General Breaks From “50 State” Mortgage Settlement,
NAKED CAPITALISM (Sept. 30, 2011), www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/09/california-attorney-generalbreaks-from-50-state-mortgage-settlement.html.
33. Smith, supra note 32.
34. Morgenson, supra note 27.
35. Smith, supra note 32. See also Matt Taibibi, The Next Big Bank Bailout, ROLLING STONE
(Oct. 5, 2011), www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/attorneys-general-settlement-the-next-bigbank-bailout-20111005.
36. Smith, supra note 32.
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complete ownership chain.37 According to Pelligrinelli “[y]ou can’t go back
and re-document these things, because some of the companies aren’t around
anymore. Even if they are, the charters for these companies don’t allow for
backdating of assignments.”38
Lawyers who have examined this issue state that it would be
unprecedented to grant a broad release from liability to banks that own
MERS from claims that have not been investigated.39 Furthermore, a broad
release of liability would vastly diminish the possibility of an in-depth
investigation of MERS and might also make it harder for borrowers to
argue that MERS had no right, or standing, to foreclose on them.40
New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman is also moving to
block a proposed $8.5 billion settlement struck in June, 2011 by Bank of
New York Mellon and Bank of America over troubled loan pools issued by
Countrywide.41 Attorney General Schneiderman filed suit against Bank of
New York for fraud in its role as trustee overseeing pools of investors.42
Additionally, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal
Reserve, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation are negotiating with the largest U.S. mortgage servicers and
signing consent decrees to improve foreclosure procedures.43
The Federal Reserve recently requested that Bank of America buy
back (known as “put backs”) residential mortgage backed securities
(“RMBS”), exclusive of the commercial mortgage market, totaling $47
billion.44 These securities were called into question when authorities
discovered the robo-signer problem. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
requested that Bank of America buy back RMBS totaling $5.6 billion in
June 2010.45 Bank of America, in turn, sued the FDIC for $1.75 billion for

37. Morgenson, supra note 26.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Gretchen Morgenson, Mortgage Settlement Changed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/business/new-york-moves-to-block-mortgage-settlement.html. See
also Yves Smith, New York Attorney General Schneiderman Drops Bomb on Bank of America
Settlement and Bank of New York, NAKED CAPITALISM (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.nakedcapitalism.
com/2011/08/new-york-attorney-general-schneiderman-drops-bomb-on-bank-of-america-settlement-an
d-bank-of-new-york.html.
42. Id.
43. Lorraine Woellert, Dakin Campbell and Carter Dougherty, Mortgage Servicers Said To Agree
to Fix Foreclosure Procedures, BLOOMBERG, (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201104-05/mortgage-servicers-said-to-agree-to-fix-foreclosure-procedures.html.
44. “Securitization” refers to mortgage loans pooled into trusts and converted into mortgagebacked securities that can be bought and sold by investors. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941
N.E.2d 40, 46 (2011).
45. Bank of America Corp. Has $11.1 Billion In Mortgage Purchase Requests, AMERICAN
BANKING AND MARKET NEWS (Aug. 9, 2010). http://www.americanbankingnews.com/2010/08/09/
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“putbacks”.46 Bank of America has also sued First American Title claiming
that First American has refused to cover more than 5,500 loans that have
caused $535 million in losses.47 In August 2011, insurer AIG filed a $10billion suit against Bank of America, accusing them and their Countrywide
Financial and Merrill Lynch units of misrepresenting the quality of
mortgages that backed the securities purchased by AIG.48 The SEC
charged Citigroup’s principal U.S. broker dealer subsidiary with
misleading investors about a $1-billion collateralized debt obligation
(“CDO”) tied to the U.S. housing market in which Citigroup bet against
investors as the housing market showed signs of distress.49 After the CDO
defaulted, investors were left with losses while Citigroup made $160
million in fees and trading profits.50 Citigroup agreed to settle the SEC’s
charges (without admitting liability) on October 19, 2011, for $285 million
to be returned to investors.51
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) is warning that
flaws may have infected millions of foreclosures and questioning whether
other regulators’ inquiries into problems at the U.S. mortgage-servicing
companies have been sufficiently thorough.52 Most recently, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) that oversees the mortgage giants
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is set to file lawsuits, seeking billions of
dollars in compensation, against more than a dozen big banks (including
Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Deutsche Bank),
accusing them of misrepresenting the quality of mortgage securities they
assembled and sold at the top of the mortgage bubble.53 The suits will
argue that banks, which assembled the mortgages and marketed them as
securities to investors, failed to perform the due diligence required under
securities law, and overlooked evidence that borrowers incomes were

bank-of-america-corp-nyse-bac-has-11-1-billion-in-mortgage-purchase-requests/#.
46. Karen Gullo, FDIC Sued By Bank of America Over Taylor Bean Mortgage Losses,
BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-20/bank-of-america-suesfdic-over-taylor-bean-mortgage-s-1-75-billion-losses.html.
47. David Mildenberg, Bank of America Sues First American on Lien Protection Claims,
BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-20/bank-of-america-suesfdic-over-taylor-bean-mortgage-s-1-75-billion-losses.html.
48. Nelson D. Schwartz, U.S. Is Set to Sue a Dozen Big Banks Over Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2011, at A1.
49. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to
Settle SEC Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-214.htm.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Alan Zibel, FDIC’s Bair: Millions of Foreclosures Could Be ‘Infected’, WALL ST. J., May 12,
2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2011/05/12/fdics-bair-millions-of-foreclosures-could-be-infected.
53. Nelson D. Schwartz, U.S. Is Set to Sue a Dozen Big Banks Over Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/business/us-is-set-to-sue-dozen-big-banks-over-mort gages. html.
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inflated or falsified.54 When borrowers were unable to pay their mortgages,
the securities backed by the mortgages quickly lost value.55 Fannie and
Freddie lost more than $30 billion, in part as a result of these deals, and the
subsequent losses were mostly passed on to taxpayers.56
In 2008, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (“HERA”)
established the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) as a supervisor
and regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.57 Through its investigation
in 2010, the FHFA recommended that it review the circumstances
surrounding FHFA’s failure to identify foreclosure abuses by the retained
attorney network used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, develop
procedures for default related legal services and develop and implement
policies and procedures to address poor performance by default-related
legal services vendors.58
Furthermore, according to a Reuters investigation (as reported by the
Huffington Post), despite these actions by elected officials and
governmental regulators, mortgage lenders are continuing to take the same
shortcuts, from sketchy paperwork to the use of robo-signers.59 Reuters
found that some of the biggest U.S. banks and other loan servicers continue
to file questionable foreclosure documents with courts and county clerks
using the same tactics that triggered an outcry, multiple investigations and
temporary moratoriums on foreclosures.60 In recent months, servicers have
filed thousands of documents that appear to have been fabricated or
improperly altered, or have sworn to false facts.61 Reuters also identified at
least six “robo-signers” who have each recently falsely signed thousands of
mortgage assignments.62 A similar Associated Press article published in
November 2011 revealed that, in investigations in July of the same year,
servicers were continuing to generate documents signed by well-known
robo-signers, including the notorious “Linda Greene”.63 According to the

54. Schwartz, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, FED HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE
MAE’S DEFAULT-RELATED LEGAL SERVICES, 8 (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/
AUD-2011-004.pdf.
58. Id. at 16–17.
59. Scot J. Paltrow, Banks Continue ‘Robo-Signing’ Foreclosure Practices In Spite Of Promises
To Contrary: Investigation, REUTERS (July 18, 2011, 7:39 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
07/18/foreclosure-banks-idUSL3E7II1UC20110718.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Yves Smith, Bank CEOs Lying When They Say They’ve Stopped Robosigning, NAKED
CAPITALISM (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11/banks-lying-when-they-saytheyve-stopped-robosiging.html.
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April 2011 60 Minutes piece, “Linda Greene” was supposedly a vice
president at twenty different banks at the same time.64
Additionally, Nevada Attorney General Catherine Cortez Mastro
recently filed a 606 count indictment against two title officers of Lender
Processing Services (“LPS”) in Clark County, Nevada for supervising and
filing tens of thousands of documents in a robo-signing scheme.65 Many of
these charges were category C and D felonies.66 A Nevada grand jury
subsequently indicted two LPS employees on alleged robo-signing of
foreclosure documents.67
Gone are the days of the S&L bailouts ultimately resulting in a net
loss to tax payers of approximately $124 billion by the end of 1999.68
Ironically, some of the same players are involved again. Now, some of the
former Keating Five (still in public service) can advise our current
government how to wade through the MERS fiasco. Banks, originators and
servicers are Lucy and the American taxpayer is Charlie Brown.
IV. THE MERS SYSTEM
A. WHAT IS MERS?
MERS is a corporation registered in Delaware and headquartered in
the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C.69 that operates a computer
database designed to track servicing and ownership rights of mortgage
loans anywhere in the United States.70 Originators and secondary market
players pay inexpensive membership dues and per-transaction fees to
MERS in exchange for the right to use and access MERS’ records.71 In

64. Chris Kirkham, Sarah Palin’s Arizona Home Purchase Clouded By Foreclosure Fraud,
Analysis Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/10/sarahpalin-arizona-home-foreclosure fraud_n_875186.html.
65. Yves Smith, Nevada Attorney General Mastro Files 606 Count Criminal Indictment Against
Two Title Officers (Updated: Lender Processing Services Employees), NAKED CAPITALISM (Nov. 16,
2011), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11/nevada-attorney-general-mamsto-files-606-count-cri
minal-indictment-against-two-title-officers.html.
66. Id.
67. Andrew Scoggin, Nevada Grand Jury Indicts 2 LPS Workers On Robo-Signing Charges,
HOUSING WIRE, (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/11/16/nevada-grand-jury-indicts2-on-robo-signing-charges.
68. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 33 (2000),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf.
69. Carson Mullen, MERS: Tracking Loans Electronically, MORTGAGE BANKING 63 (May 31,
2000) http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/3594162-1.html.
70. Howard Schneider, MERS Aids Electronic Mortgage Program, MORTGAGE BANKING 42 (Jan.
1, 1997) http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/608126-1.html.
71. Schneider, supra note 70.

Summer 2012

MERS AND LOST TITLE

379

addition to tracking ownership and servicing rights, when closing on home
mortgages, many mortgage lenders now list MERS as the “mortgagee of
record” on the paper mortgage rather than the actual mortgagee.72 MERS
was designed to improve the efficiency and profitability of the primary and
secondary mortgage markets.73 The benefit of naming MERS as the
nominal mortgagee of record is that when the member transfers an interest
in the mortgage loan to another MERS member, MERS may (or may not)
privately track the assignment within its system, however, MERS remains
the mortgagee of record in publicly recorded documents.74 In 2011, MERS
proposed a rule change to stop members from foreclosing in its name.75
B. MERS CONNECTION TO SUB-PRIME LOANS AND SECURITIZATION
Before 1995, typically a qualified home buyer applied for a mortgage
loan (whole-loan) with his/her local bank, credit union or savings and
loan.76 The credit-worthy borrower agreed to make payments until the
mortgage debt was paid in full. Around 1995, a new breed of loan came
into play—the sub-prime loan. These loans (often times for one hundred
percent or more of the market value of the residential property and no
longer dependent upon a borrower’s credit worthiness) changed the
landscape of mortgage banking, leading, in part, to the current foreclosure
crisis. These loans were created and supported by lawmakers. For
example, according to Congresswoman Maxine Waters:
[U]nder the outstanding leadership of Mr. Frank Raines everything in
the 1992 act has worked just fine. In fact, the GSE’s [Fannie and
Freddie] have exceeded their housing goals. What we need to do today
is to focus on the regulator, and this must be done in a manner so as not
to impede their affordable housing mission, a mission that has seen
innovation flourish from desktop underwriting to 100 percent loans.77

Knowing that their borrowers were not credit worthy and that the
borrowers’ home mortgages would almost certainly end in default,
72. R.K. Arnold, Yes, There Is Life On MERS, 11 PROB. & PROP. 16, 32–34 (1997).
73. John R. Hooge & Laurie Williams, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.: A Survey
of Cases Discussing MERS Authority To Act, NORTON BANKR.LAW ADVISOR, Aug. 2010, at 2.
74. Id.
75. Laura Marcinek, BofA, Citigroup Say Mortgage Database Draws Scrutiny In Foreclosure
Probe, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-03-02/bofa-citigrouppnc-say-mers-mortgage-database-draws-probes.html.
76. Scot Paltrow & Leslie Adler (editor), Factbox: The Role of MERS In Foreclosure Furor,
REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/13/us-usa-foreclosures-mers-idUS
TRE69C69720101013.
77. The Secondary Mortgage Market Enterprises Regulatory Improvement Act: Hearing on H.R.
2575 Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv. U.S. H.R., 108th Cong. 9 (2003) (statement of Rep. Maxine
Waters), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg92628/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg92628.
pdf. (emphasis added).
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mortgage lenders unloaded these loans as quickly as possible to large
institutional banks. These banks, in turn, bought and sold the loans
amongst themselves and subsequently pooled them into trusts and then
converted them into mortgage backed securities (also referred to as
collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), meaning that the asset behind the
paper is real property). These CDOs were bought and sold by and to
investors.78 Mortgage-backed securities were almost uniformly rated AAA
or Aaa by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poors.79 The AAA rating was
appealing to risk adverse investors and these mortgage backed securities
ended up in conservative pension funds such as CalPERS and conservative
investment brokerage funds owned by companies such as MetLife,
Blackrock, Inc. and Allstate.80
In the midst of creating these trusts and mortgage-backed securities,
MERS was created to shuffle these loans quickly between lenders, leaving
homeowners unable to find out who actually owned their mortgage at any
given time.81
Mortgages would be changing hands dozens of times, going from loan
originators to banks to Wall Street investment houses, which would
collect them by the thousands and package them into complex debt
instruments that would be chopped up into shares and sold off to
multiple investors all over the world.82

C. WHAT IS WRONG WITH MERS?
After the financial collapse of 2008, MERS began foreclosure actions
on behalf of lenders.83 The creation of MERS allowed mortgage companies
to list MERS as the proxy for the true mortgage holder in local government
records and to record subsequent changes of ownership in the MERS
78. Yasha Levine, How an Obscure Outfit Called MERS Is Subverting Our Entire System of
Property Rights, ALTERNET (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/economy/149189/dude,_where
%27s_my_mortgage_how_an_obscure_outfit_called_mers_is_subverting_our_entire_system_of_prope
rty _rights/?page=entire.
79. Peter Cohan, Behind the $4 Trillion in CDOs: Sneaky Banks and Worthless Ratings, DAILY
FINANCE (Apr. 26, 2010, 10:45AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/04/26/explaining-the-4trillion-cdo-scam-worthless-ratings-hide-inve/ (also stating that ninety-three percent of the 2006 AAA
ratings were later downgraded to junk).
80. Allstate Sues BofA on MBS Purchase, ZACKS.COM (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.zacks.com/
stock/news/45341/Allstate+Sues+BofA+on+MBS+Purchase (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
81. This lack of knowledge often led to payments made to the wrong bank or lender because the
homeowner could not look to publicly recorded deeds to determine the ever changing identity of their
lender. Michael Grover, Fed-led Research Reveals Need for Better Twin Cities Foreclosure Data,
COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_
display.cfm?id=2200.
82. Levine, supra note 78.
83. Robbie Whelan, Lawmaker Questions Power To Foreclose, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2010), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704865104575588791583567372.html.
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system only.84 A spokeswoman for Fannie Mae told the New York Times
that Fannie Mae could never rely on MERS to find ownership of a loan.85
In 2010, Alan M. White (Law Professor at Valparaiso University Law
School, Indiana) matched MERS ownership records against those in the
public domain and found that fewer than thirty percent of the mortgages
had accurate records in MERS.86 Robo-signed documents, inaccurate or
non-existent record keeping, the failure to publically record assignments of
mortgages and the use of MERS as the mortgagee or nominee have led to
the homeowners’ inability to figure out who owns and services their
mortgages or to trace back their chain of title. In using the inaccurate and
alleged to be fraudulent MERS system, banks are actually denying
homeowners their due process rights before they lose their homes to
foreclosure.
Furthermore, because the MERS system allowed lenders to avoid the
time and expense of going through the County Recorder’s office to file and
record title documents, MERS also robs County Recorders of filing fees.
In fact, various county recorders have begun to take action attempting to
recoup some of these fees. In Massachusetts, South Essex Register of
Deeds John O’Brien reported that he had received a green light to withdraw
what could be millions of dollars from Bank of America accounts by
arguing that banks have used MERS to deny the South Essex registry
millions of dollars in fees to which it was entitled.87 Dallas County District
Attorney Craig Watkins filed a lawsuit (later turned into a class action)
against MERS and Bank of America Corp. over unpaid filing fees.88
Similarly, counties in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Oklahoma have also
sued MERS—all claiming that the MERS system has cheated them out of
filing fees.89
Some homeowners are arguing that MERS does not have a right to
initiate foreclosure actions because MERS does not hold the title and the
corresponding note to their properties. These same homeowners are also

84. Marian Wang, Backgrounder: A Closer Look at MERS, the Industry’s Controversial Mortgage
Clearinghouse, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 7, 2011, 4:53 PM), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/back
grounder-a-closer-look-at-mers-the-industrys-controversial-mortgage-cle (emphasis added).
85. Wang, supra note 84.
86. Id.
87. Eric Convey, Deeds Head Gets OK To Yank BofA Funds, BOS. BUS. J. (April 6, 2011,
9:46AM),http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2011/04/06/deeds-head-gets-ok-to-yank-bofafunds.
html; see also Austin Kilgore, Recorder Wants To Close Account at Bank of America To Protest MERS,
NAT’L MORTG. NEWS (Apr. 11, 2011, 11:20PM), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/on_features/
recorder-wants-to-close-bofa-account-1024417-1.html.
88. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Dallas Revises MERS Filing-Fee Suit to Add All Texas Counties,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/dallas-seeks-to-add-alltexas-counties-to-mers-filing-fee-suit.html.
89. Id.
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arguing that the MERS system does not accurately show which lender
holds the trust deed for title on the foreclosed property. Furthermore, even
if MERS forecloses a property for a lender (that does not actually have title
and the corresponding note to the property), an argument could be made
that the lender may be prohibited from reselling the property because the
lender cannot sell that which it does not own. According to recent court
rulings, there may be no standing to foreclose without proof of title and the
note, there may be no standing to foreclose.90 To foreclose on real
property, the plaintiff must establish the chain of title entitling plaintiff to
relief.91 MERS has acknowledged, and recent cases have held, that MERS
is a mere nominee—an entity appointed by the true owner simply for the
purpose of holding property in order to facilitate transactions.92 Recent
court opinions stress that this defect is not just a procedural one but is also
a substantive failure, one that is fatal to the plaintiff’s ability to foreclose.93
Sheila Bair, former Chairperson of the FDIC, testified before a Senate
Committee opining that flawed banking processes, including faulty
transfers of loan documents, “have potentially infected millions of
foreclosures, and the damages to be assessed against these operations could
be significant and take years to materialize.”94 Bank-friendly legislators
and attorneys generally would have the public believe that the entire
economic recovery is tied to the public’s willingness to look the other way.
MERS was set up without considering how it would destroy or
seriously dilute accurate and recorded chain of title records in event of
mass foreclosure. Already, chains of title have been lost in the frenzy of
trading and packaging these mortgages into mortgage-backed securities.
Today, MERS servicers and related foreclosure mills are literally breaking
a centuries-old custom that protected property rights by requiring every
sale of property to be publically recorded (pursuant to race/notice statutes)
and requiring that any creditor claiming a right to foreclose demonstrate
clear title (with an endorsed note in the creditor’s name and a record at the
county office showing transfer of the property). Subsequently, many

90. See U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Mass. 2011); In re Agard, 444
B.R. 231, 254 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011).
91. Ellen Brown, Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes Be Foreclosure-Proof?, YES!
MAGAZINE (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/homeowners-rebellion-could62-million-homes-be-foreclosure-proof.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: Monitoring Systematic Risk and Promoting
Financial Stability: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Banking, House., and Urban Affairs, 112
Congress 22–23 (2011) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&File
Store_id=94d50f1a-75eb-4586-b025-76e44870816b.
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homeowners can no longer search public records to find out who holds
their mortgage because the record shows MERS as the mortgage holder
and/or the purchaser of the foreclosed property, even though financial
entities may act as a trustee to transactions. Chain of title may become lost
due to its inability to be traced amongst the hundreds of thousands of
MERS transactions. In the event the chain of title is lost (or at least
diluted), MERS has a negative effect on the mortgaged homes, and each
adjoining property adjacent to those homes, including those without a
mortgage.95 MERS is simply not a viable substitute for the four hundred
year old system of publicly recording deeds pursuant to race/notice statutes
in county records offices that make the deeds available for anyone to
reference in determining property rights.
D. RECENT COURT RULINGS CRITICAL OF MERS
MERS and securitization problems have come to light in several
publicized court cases. A sampling of these recent cases include:
1. U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez
In January 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court’s invalidation of two home foreclosures, stating that lenders Wells
Fargo Bank and U.S. Bank had failed to prove that they owned the
mortgages.96 Ibanez dealt with loans that had been pooled into mortgagebacked securities. The two foreclosures were made in the names of Wells
Fargo and US Bank; however, neither of the banks had written mortgages.97
Instead, they were acting as trustees, or financial caretakers, for pools of
loans made and serviced by other lenders.98 The Massachusetts’ Supreme
Court stated:
We agree with the judge that the plaintiffs, who were not the original
mortgagees, failed to make the required showing that they were the
holders of the mortgages at the time of foreclosure. As a result, they
did not demonstrate that the foreclosure sales were valid to convey title
to the subject properties, and their requests for a declaration of clear
title were properly denied.99

The Court stated that, for plaintiffs to obtain the judicial declaration of

95. See Section 5 infra.
96. E. Scott Reckard, Foreclosure Ruling Could Be Setback for Banks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/07/business/la-fi-foreclosure-ruling-20110107. See also Ibanez,
941 N. E. 2d at 44.
97. Id. at 96.
98. Reckard, supra note 96.
99. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40,44 (Mass. 2011) (emphasis added).
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clear title “they had to prove their authority to foreclose under the power of
sale and show their compliance with the requirements on which this
authority rests.”100 Plaintiffs could not provide this proof.101 Plaintiffs
needed to be assignees of the mortgage at the time of the notice of sale and
subsequent foreclosure sale in order to exercise the power of sale contained
in the mortgages.102 Furthermore, the Court held that, like a sale of land
itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of interest in land that
requires a writing signed by the grantor.103
As for the remedy in the case, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
ruled that the defendants’ foreclosures had to be undone because industry
securitization practices had violated real estate law governing how
mortgages could be transferred.104 Massachusetts is one of twenty-seven
non-judicial foreclosure states. Although this ruling is only binding in
Massachusetts, we can expect the other twenty-six states to more closely
examine their previous lower court rulings. The end result may be an
individual homeowner that owes the holder of their note the dollar value of
the mortgage on the property; however, the property itself is no longer
collateral for the loan.
Other courts have agreed with the reasoning in Ibanez. For example:
It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale
where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree
or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully
conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a
mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and
parties.105

The Ibanez problem highlights the flaws with the securitization
process and the MERS system. Its failure to publically record deed
transfers and conveyances (along with sloppy paperwork) led these
mortgage transfers to be deemed invalid.
2. In re Agard
In the course of the bankruptcy case entitled In re Agard, a creditor
sought relief from an automatic stay to foreclose on a second interest in the

100. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 51 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 54.
102. Id. at 55 (citing In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (“Acquiring the
mortgage after the entry and foreclosure sale does not satisfy the Massachusetts statute.”).
103. See Id.
104. Thom Weidlich, Foreclosures May Be Undone by Massachusetts Ruling on Mortgage
Transfers, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6, 2011), www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-01-06.
105. 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1286 (2011); see also In
re Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 244 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011)
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debtor’s real property.106 MERS, as an intervener, argued that the terms of
its membership agreement with the original lender and its successors in
interest, as well as New York state agency laws, gave MERS the authority
to assign a mortgage.107 MERS argued that it held legal title to mortgages
for its members/lenders as both “nominee” and “mortgagee of record.”108
In his highly critical response to MERS’s request that the Court analyze the
MERS business model, Judge Robert E. Grossman stated:
The Court recognizes that an adverse ruling regarding MERS’s
authority to assign mortgages or act on behalf of its members/lenders
could have a significant impact on MERS and upon the lenders which
do business with MERS throughout the United States. . . . This Court
does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with
50% of all residential mortgages in the country, that is reason enough
for this Court to turn a blind eye to the fact that this process does not
comply with the law.109

The Court rejected MERS arguments that it acted as nominee,
mortgagee or agent, adding that “in all future cases which involve MERS,
the moving party must show that it validly holds both the mortgage and the
underlying note in order to prove standing before this Court.”110
3. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez
This Massachusetts Supreme Court case involves the rights of a third
party Bevilacqua, who acquired title to a home in good faith against the
procedural and legal safeguards surrounding the foreclosure process and
Bevilacqua
procedural protections against wrongful foreclosures.111
acquired a home by quit claim deed from U.S. Bank (as trustee and note
holder) in 2006.112 U.S. Bank initiated foreclosure on the home’s previous
owner Pablo Rodriguez without receiving an official mortgage assignment
from MERS.113 Unfortunately, U.S. Bank did not actually have title to the
property when it transferred the home to Bevilacqua.114 On April 12, 2010,
Bevilacqua filed a “try title” action in the Massachusetts Land Court to
compel Rodriguez to try title to the property.115 In his complaint,
Bevilacqua claimed to reside at the property and hold record title but,
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

In re Agard, 444 B.R. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254.
Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 918 (Mass. 2011).
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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because MERS had not assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank at the time of
foreclosure, Bevilacqua alleged that there was a cloud on his title in the
form of “the possibility of an adverse claim by Rodriguez against
Bevilacqua’s title to the property.”116 Rodriguez had not been located and
did not enter an appearance in this case.117
In 2005, Rodriguez granted a mortgage on the property to MERS, as
nominee for Finance America, LLC.118 This mortgage was recorded.119 As
of June 29, 2006, MERS had not assigned this mortgage to U.S. Bank,
however, on this date, U.S. Bank executed a foreclosure deed referencing
the mortgage and purporting to transfer the property pursuant to a
foreclosure sale from U.S. Bank to U.S. Bank “as Trustee under the
securitization Servicing Agreement dated as of July 1, 2005 . . . .”120 One
month later, MERS assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank in a recorded
assignment.121 A confirmatory foreclosure deed was then granted on
October 9, 2006, by U.S. Bank to U.S. Bank as trustee under the servicing
agreement.122 On October 17, 2006, U.S. Bank, as trustee, granted a
quitclaim deed to Bevilacqua.123
The issue in this case was whether a person who holds title to property
by virtue of a recorded deed, but whose title is clouded by a possible
adverse claim due to deficiencies from a prior foreclosure in his chain of
tile, has standing to try title. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, citing
precedent from U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez, wrote that
“Massachusetts adheres to the familiar rule that one who sells under a
power of sale must follow strictly its terms so, where a foreclosure sale
occurs in the absence of authority, there is no valid execution of the power,
and the sale is wholly void.”124 The Court continued to explain that “[o]ne
of the terms of the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the
restriction on who is entitled to foreclose.”125
The Court reasoned that by Bevilacqua “alleging that U.S. Bank was
not the assignee of the mortgage at the time of the purported foreclosure,
Bevilacqua is necessarily asserting that the power of sale was not complied
with, that the purported sale was invalid, and that his grantor’s title was

116. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d, at 888.
117. Id. at 887.
118. Id. at 888.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 888.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 892–93 (quoting U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 646 (2011), quoting
Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E. 967 (1905)).
125. Id.
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defective.”126 The Court then stated that “[i]n light of its defective title, the
intention of U.S. Bank to transfer the property to Bevilacqua is irrelevant
and he cannot become owner of the property pursuant to a quit claim
deed.”127
The Court held that, although the purchaser was in physical possession
of the property when he filed the try title action, he lacked standing because
his chain of title rested on a foreclosure sale conducted by someone other
than the mortgagee or his successors and that a single deed considered
without reference to its chain of title was insufficient to show record title as
required by Massachusetts law.128 Additionally, the Court held that the
purchaser could not claim record title based on a theory that he was a bona
fide purchaser for value and without notice and dismissed Bevilacqua’s
complaint.129
Bevilacqua contrasts the principles of nemo dat quod non habet (you
can’t give away what you do not own) and bona fide purchaser (one who
takes in good faith for value and without notice of defect will get legal
protection against claims).130 As exemplified in Bevilacqua, nemo dat
prevails.131
One commentator summarized the problems associated with
Bevilacqua as follows:
The court just said you might be able to go back and re-foreclose (on
the property) and prove title, but you do not have clear title now . . . .
The issue for a homeowner has to prove that a foreclosing entity had
the right to foreclose. But if I am someone who has bought a
foreclosure, I now cannot sell my home until I can prove that the
foreclosing entity had that right of foreclosure, which might be difficult
for me to prove.132

126. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d, at 888.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 886.
129. Id.
130. Adam Levitin, Nemo Dat Trumps Bona Fide Purchaser, Credit Slips (Oct. 2011)
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/10/nemo-dat-trumps-bona-fide -purchaser.html
131. Id.
132. Kerri Panchuk, Buyer of Invalid Foreclosure Loses Appeal to Clear Property Title, HOUSING
WIRE (Oct. 18, 2011).
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V. HOW MERS HAS BROKEN OR DILUTED CHAIN OF TITLE FOR
BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN FORECLOSED PROPERTIES
AND ALL OF THEIR NEIGHBORS
A. MERS HAS BROKEN OR SEVERELY DILUTED CHAIN OF TITLE
In the midst of buying and selling mortgages between banks and
creating mortgage backed securities, MERS was created to shuffle home
loans quickly between lenders, leaving homeowners unable to find out who
actually owned their mortgage at any given time.133 In addition to tracking
ownership and servicing rights, when closing on home mortgages,
mortgage lenders now often list MERS as the “mortgagee of record” on the
paper mortgage rather than the real mortgagee.134 The mortgage is then
recorded with the county property recorder’s office under MERS, Inc.’s
name rather than under the lender’s name.135 Historically, employees of
county recording offices kept records of each individual company that
recorded mortgage loans and mortgage loan assignments, but not today—
today MERS is the only company listed.136 Currently, it is estimated that
MERS holds over half of all mortgages in the United States—
approximately 60 million mortgages137
In this process, while MERS holds mortgages as the “mortgagee of
record” promissory notes are separated and sequentially transferred from
community bank to larger bank to investment bank to mortgage backed
security without these transfers between banks ever being publically
recorded or traceable in the grantor/grantee indexes.138 Sometimes these
transfers are documented in the MERS system (rather than the county
property recorder’s office) and sometimes they are never documented at
all.139 MERS then initiates foreclosure actions on behalf of lenders.140 As

133. This lack of knowledge often led to payments made to the wrong bank or lender because the
homeowner could not look to publicly recorded deeds to determine the ever changing identity of their
lender. Michael Grover, Fed-led Research Reveals Need For Better Twin Cities Foreclosure Data, THE
FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Sept. 2006), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/
pub_display.cfm?id=2200.
134. R.K. Arnold, Yes, There Is Life on MERS, 11-AUG PROB. & PROP. 32, 32–34 (1997). See also
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359 (2010), for a comprehensive explanation of the MERS
process.
135. Peterson, supra note 134, at 1361.
136. Id. at 1362.
137. Michael Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your Loan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at BU1.
138. See Marian Wang, Backgrounder: A Closer Look at MERS, the Industry’s Controversial
Mortgage Clearinghouse, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/back
grounder-a-closer-look-at-mers-the-industrys-controversial-mortgage-cle.
139. Wang, supra note 138.
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stated above, courts have held that MERS lacks standing to foreclose on a
particular property, and many times, the actual owner of the property
cannot even be determined because of falsified (robo-signed), backdated or
lost/nonexistent records.
This phenomenon also means that the property’s chain of title is lost
in public records or severely diluted (because it cannot be traced amongst
the hundreds of thousands of MERS transactions). If the chain of title is
lost for a foreclosed property, any property that shares a common property
boundary line with that foreclosed property may have also lost its senior
rights in a boundary dispute. Boundary disputes between neighbors are
very common; however, they were historically not well publicized. This is
simply because these boundary disputes were previously resolved by
searching chain of title records and dividing property according to the
principles listed above. Now that chain-of-title is destroyed/severely
diluted, these same boundary disputes will require court intervention to set
boundary lines. Additionally, because of clouded titles, both foreclosed
property owners and their neighbors may not be able to sell their properties
because buyers will not be able to obtain title insurance (or provide the
same warranty deed issued by a lender) and consequently, buyers will not
be able to obtain financing.
As an example of these principles, see Diagram B on the next two
pages.

140. Robbie Whelan, Lawmaker Questions Power to Foreclose, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 1, 2010), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704865104575588791583567372.html.
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Diagram B
MERS Conveyance
Original Grantor A

Orignal grantor
believes he owns
100 feet but he
really owns 95 feet.

A conveys East 50 feet to
B in 1960. Conveyance
v recorded and traceable in
grantor/grantee index.

A
Remainder
(1960)

A
Remainder
(1965)

A conveys his
remaining 20 feet to
D in 1970. It is
conveyed as 25 feet
because A thinks he
has 25 feet left to
convey.
Conveyance is
recorded as 25 feet
and is traceable in
grantor/grantee
index.

D conveys what he
thinks is 25 feet to
E in 2008 (it is
really 20 feet.)
Conveyance
recorded and
traceable in
grantor/grantee
index.

C
East 25
ft.
(1965)

D
Remainder
(1970)

A conveys
East 25 feet
of his
remaining
parcel to C in
1965.
Conveyance
recorded and
traceable in
grantor/
grantee index.

B
East 50 ft.
(1960)

B
East 50 ft.
(1960)

C
East 25 ft.
(1965)

B
East 50 ft.
(1960)
At this point, if a
survey reveals that the
original parcel A
contained 95 feet,
normal rules determine
junior and senior
rights without the need
for litigation. Tracing
back to grantor A, B
will get 50 feet (1960),
C will get 25 feet
(1965), E will get the
remaining 20 feet (D
acquired 20 feet in
1970 from A.)

E
Remainder
(2008)

C
East 25 ft.
(1965)

B
East 50 ft.
(1960)
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NOW THE PROBLEM STARTS
MERS Conveyance
E
(2008)

E loses his
property in
a 2009
foreclosure
done in the
name of
MERS.

MERS
2009

Bank
One
Note
Holder

Bank
Two
Note
Holder

Bank
Three
Note
Holder

Bank Three
conveys
property to F in
2010.

C
East 25 ft.
(1965)

MERS holds
the mortgage
as a nominee.

In this series of
conveyances, the mortgage
and the note are separated.
Due to the fact that these
conveyances were not
recorded and are not
traceable in the
grantor/grantee index (in
combination with lost
paperwork, back-dated and
forged documents, and
robo-signatures) these
conveyances starting with
E’s foreclosure by MERS in
2009 cannot be traced back
up to E (or earlier) without
looking at hundreds of
thousands of MERS
transactions. Because of
post-dating, this search
cannot be confined to a
given year. There is no
way to trace the property
back to the original grantor
A. The chain of title is
broken/severely diluted and
a wild deed is created.

MERS
conveys note
to Bank One.
Conveyance is
not recorded
and is not
traceable in
the grantor/
grantee index.
Bank One
conveys note
to Bank Two.
Conveyance is
not recorded
and is not
traceable in
the grantor/
grantee index.
Bank Two
conveys note
to Bank Three.
Conveyance is
not recorded
and is not
traceable in
the grantor/
grantee index.

F
(2010)

B
East 50 ft.
(1960)

C
(1980)

B
(1960)
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Bank three (note holder) conveys the foreclosed property to F in 2010.
There are several problems with this conveyance:
First Set of Problems:
1. Bank Three cannot prove it actually owns title to the property because
the note and the mortgage were separated in 2009 (MERS held the
mortgage and the note was assigned to Bank One, Bank Two, and Bank
Three in a series of transactions and none of the transactions were
recorded.) This is a wild deed.
a. Because Bank Three cannot prove they own title to the property to
convey to F, F cannot obtain title insurance on the property unless
Bank Three agrees to indemnify F (or provide a warranty deed)
against any title claims or losses as part of F’s title insurance policy.
b. Similarly, F cannot prove that he owns title to the property (clouded
title/wild deed); therefore, F will have a problem selling the property
because:
(1) Realistically, F will not be able to indemnify a prospective
buyer against any title claims or losses (as Bank Three had done
for F);
(2) A prospective buyer will not be able to obtain title insurance
because the property’s title is clouded and the property has a wild
deed. Without title insurance or a redeemable warranty deed, a
prospective buyer cannot obtain financing (leaving only cash
buyers);
(3) A clouded title/wild deed will diminish the market value of
the property when F tries to sell the property even if he can find a
cash buyer.
Second Set of Problems:
2. When F purchased the property in 2010, Bank Three believed that it was
conveying twenty-five feet to F. F also believed that he was purchasing
twenty-five feet. F had a survey done in 2010 to determine boundaries. In
conducting the survey, the surveyor found:
a. The original grantor A (traced back from B and C properties) only had
a total of ninety-five feet to convey due to a prior survey discrepancy.
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b. The surveyor must determine the senior rights between F, C, and B
in order to determine who gets what portion of the ninety-five feet
(senior and junior rights); however, this cannot be determined
because:
(1) F thinks he owns twenty-five feet, C thinks he owns twentyfive feet, and B thinks he owns fifty feet.
(2) The surveyor cannot trace F’s property back to E due to the
MERS transactions, so you cannot determine whose conveyance
came first in time (thus senior by race/notice statutes)—F, B, or C.
(3) Therefore, the surveyor cannot determine who has senior and
who has junior rights between F, B, and C.
c. All three properties (F, B, and C) now have unclear boundary lines
creating a cloud on all three properties’ titles.
(1) F, B, and C will have to disclose the boundary discrepancy
when they attempt to sell their properties.
(2) The boundary discrepancy will create a cloud on title for all
three properties, diminishing the properties’ values.
(3) The cloud on title will make it impossible for prospective
buyers to obtain title insurance (and financing) on any of the three
properties.
d. Because of the broken/diluted chain of title and the boundary
discrepancy, F, B, and C will have to go to court to have their
boundary lines adjudicated (even if they agree to a compromise)
because a surveyor cannot make this determination absent a court
order. This process is expensive and time consuming, holding up land
sales, disposition of estates and family trust, and negatively affecting
the American economy.
B. A PURCHASER MAY NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN TITLE INSURANCE ON A
FORECLOSED PROPERTY PROCESSED THROUGH MERS
Title insurance “involves the issuance of an insurance policy
promising that, if the state of the title is other than as represented on the
face of the policy, and if the insured suffers loss as a result of the
difference, the insurer will reimburse the insured for that loss and any
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related legal expenses, up to the face amount of the policy.”141 When a title
insurance policy represents that a title search was made, it impliedly
represents that the defects, impediments and other matters mentioned in the
policy and excluded from coverage are the only ones disclosed by a search
of public records (or disclosed on a new proper survey commissioned at the
time the policy is issued). To the average person who has paid for a title
search made in connection with a policy of title insurance, the policy itself
serves as the abstract of title.142 The GAO 07-401 reported on the nefarious
loss and loss adjustment claims of title insurance premiums.143 The concept
of title insurance is largely not understood by the average homeowner.
Title insurers pay few claims (usually high dollars) with only five percent
of the premiums paid as losses/ loss adjustments (2005).144
MERS has broken or severely diluted the chain of title for foreclosed
properties (see Diagram B above) and their neighbors (with sequential
conveyances and a boundary discrepancy). Consequently, all of these
homeowners will have clouded titles. With clouded titles, subsequent
purchasers of any of these properties (foreclosure or neighbor with
sequential conveyance and boundary discrepancy) will not be able to obtain
title insurance without specific exemptions, and in turn, they will also not
be able to obtain financing, leaving only investment purchasers able to pick
up properties for cash at a discounted price. These same investors may not
be able to resell these properties—except to other investors. In fact, many
pundits have attempted to tie unemployment and economic recovery
directly to the housing crisis while portraying homeowners as irresponsible
for failing to pay their mortgages. What they have failed to acknowledge is
that, at the end of the day, the United States has a glut of houses available
to very few legitimately qualified buyers. Gone are the days of income
stated loans, $0 down payments and giving mortgages to anyone with a
pulse. Letting lenders and MERS off the hook without liability after their
own strategic defaults and mortgage swaps for pennies on the dollar will
not increase the number of qualified buyers. The real question is, who will
buy these title-defective houses now?
The inventory of foreclosed properties is being off-loaded to cash
paying investors. Many of these investors pay cash allowing them to act
quickly without lender involvement. Lenders typically require title
insurance as a condition of a real property loan. Investors, paying cash to

141. Lick Mill Creek Apartments v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1991).
See also CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.1 (West 2011).
142. Banville v. Schmidt, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126, 131–36 (Ct. App. 1974).
143. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-401, TITLE INSURANCE: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF THE TITLE INDUSTRY AND BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS, 41–42 (2007).
144. Id.
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purchase properties, may forego title insurance. Although these investors
are presumed to be bona fide purchasers, they may not hold clear and
marketable title or title insurance on the property they purchased. In fact,
they may have to litigate.145 In actuality, this resourceful cash buyer may
be stuck with the property purchased. When the investor attempts to resell
the property to a subsequent purchaser, they will have a problem. In this
scenario, a prudent lender will require additional title insurance
endorsements as protection against clouded title issues. Title companies
will not offer these endorsements and, when the subsequent purchaser’s
loan falls apart, the investor will be stuck with the property unless he/she
can find another cash buyer or file an expensive and lengthy quiet title
action. Also, if the investor attempts to sell the property, he/she faces
liability including, but not limited to, contract rescission due to state
disclosure statutes.146 Time will prove that the purchase of many
foreclosures (at any price) was a foolish investment. Purchasers should be
asking “How good is the warranty (on a warranty deed) issued by a limited
liability company liquidating an inventory of housing?” See Section VII
below regarding consumer protection tips regarding purchasing
foreclosures.
We have already started to see this MERS problem in the context of
title insurance become a reality. According to Bloomberg October 20,
2010 “Fidelity National To Require Banks To Sign Foreclosure Warranty,”
because of the problems with MERS, in order for an individual buyer to
obtain title insurance on a foreclosed home purchased from a bank, banks
were required to provide a written indemnity to the title insurer and buyer
stating that the bank actually owns the property and would defend against
any subsequent claims on title.147 At one point in October 2010, Old
Republic was reportedly refusing to write title policies for some
foreclosures all together148 (although this policy was subsequently changed
and the indemnification requirement was relaxed).149 Why? Because if one

145. See Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. 2011).
146. See Scotch Bonnett Realty Corp. v. Matthews, 417 Md. 570 (2011) (analyzing the differences
between a forged deed and a deed obtained by false pretenses in Maryland; a deed obtained through
fraud, deceit or trickery is voidable as between the parties thereto, but not as to a bona fide purchaser.
A forged deed on the other hand, is void ab initio).
147. Danielle Kucera, Fidelity National To Require Banks To Sign Foreclosure Warranty,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-20/fidelity-national-torequire-banks-to-sign-warranty-for-foreclosure-sales.html.
148. Stephanie Armour, Old Republic To Stop Writing Policies For Some Foreclosures, USA
TODAY (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-10-02-old-republicforeclosures_N.htm.
149. Danielle Kucera, Fidelity National Drops Plan For Lender Foreclosure Guarantee,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-27/fidelity-national-dropsplan-for-lender-foreclosure-guarantee.html.
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of the four major title companies required indemnity or refused to insure
foreclosures altogether, this would be the demise of the title industry. The
problems with boundary disputes will soon follow.
The only thing holding the title companies together is a piece of duct
tape and a stick of gum. Currently, title companies are being hit with large
claims due to the loss of priority of liens and loans (another form of junior
and senior rights).
As shown in Diagram B above:
 A bank cannot prove that it actually owns the foreclosed property
because the note and the mortgage are separated creating a wild
deed.
 As a result, a first subsequent buyer of the foreclosed property may
not be able to obtain title insurance unless the bank agrees to
indemnify this first subsequent buyer against any title claims or
losses as part of the first subsequent buyer’s title insurance policy.
 Even if the bank and the title insurer work together to provide title
insurance to this first subsequent buyer for the foreclosed
property, when this first subsequent buyer goes to re-sell the
foreclosed property to a second subsequent buyer, the first
subsequent buyer will have a clouded title and wild deed and the
second subsequent buyer will not be able to obtain title insurance
and financing without indemnity from the first subsequent buyer
(which in all likelihood this buyer cannot provide).
 If there is a boundary dispute and land shortage as a result of
sequential conveyances between the first subsequent buyer and
his/her neighbors and the parties cannot trace the conveyances
back to the original grantor to determine junior and senior rights
because MERS has destroyed or severely diluted chain of title
records, this first subsequent buyer’s neighbors will also have
unclear boundaries, clouded titles that must be disclosed and these
neighbors will not be able to sell their properties to buyers
requiring title insurance to obtain financing.
 This first subsequent buyer’s property and all of this party’s
neighbors’ properties will be diminished in value because of the
clouded titles on their properties.
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C. THE TORRENS SYSTEM—AN ALTERNATIVE?
The only known alternative to the chain of title system is the Torrens
system which registers the owner, not the land.150 Minnesota and
Massachusetts (via the Massachusetts Land Court system) have established
Torrens systems, as well as cities such as Chicago and San Francisco,
where fire destroyed the land title records.151
To institute a Torrens system, you must have a court finding that
eliminates the necessity for a chain of title and a declaration of the property
location.152 Under the Torrens system, the owner’s certificate of title
defeats any competing claims not declared at the initial proceedings.153
Furthermore, a Torrens system would require a survey and court costs for
each individual property. Conceivably, if done properly, a Torrens system
would take hundreds of years to create—not exactly a feasible solution.
Additionally, once established, each state must guarantee rights of
ownership and establish a fund to pay the costs for errors in court
determined ownership. Although a Torrens system would, in essence,
eliminate the need for title insurance, it would be too expensive and take
too long to implement. As it stands, there is simply no reasonable
alternative to maintaining our chain of title system—a system that MERS
has frustrated.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recently, there have been calls to create a national system/standard for
originating, selling and servicing mortgage loans.154 The MERS system is
an example of a flawed national system that did not take into account the
fact that each state determines its own real property laws and recording
system. A nationalized system simply will not work. Land ownership is
local. Each state has its own laws governing the real property and the laws
applicable to one state cannot work in another state.
Kurt Pfotenhauer, chief executive of the American Land Title
Association, said MERS is an “elegant solution” to the inefficiencies of

150. CURTIS M. BROWN, WALTER G. ROBILLARD & DONALD A. WILSON, BROWN’S BOUNDARY
CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES, 52–53 (6th ed. 2009).
151. Id. at 53.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Christopher Whalen, The Ibanez Decision: What It Means For Homeowners and Investors,
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2011) (referencing An Open Letter To U.S. Regulators Regarding National Loan
Servicing Standards (Dec. 21, 2010)), http://blogs.reuters.com/christopher-whalen/2011/01/10/theibanez-decision-what-it-means-for-home-owners-and-investors.
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paperwork.155 Although he would welcome more regulatory oversight,
Pfotenhauer said title companies have found the database to be accurate
and that its main flaw is that it doesn’t contain every mortgage in America.
This is a remarkable statement from a title insurance industry
representative. The idea may be to apply the golden rule—he with all the
gold rules. If MERS controlled all mortgages, maybe MERS would be
deemed too big to fail (like AIG). However, land title is not about
securities. It just so happened that mortgage backed securities were formed
as a market gamble. Investors may have gambled and lost, however,
MERS cannot be allowed to ruin land title as a result of this securitization.
MERS, a shell company with forty-five employees and 20,000 Vice
Presidents (paying $25.00 each for the right to use the MERS name), may
destroy our land title records affecting all American homeowners (not just
those unfortunate enough to face foreclosure) if appropriate actions are not
taken. Chain of title destruction boils down to the destruction of a basic
American right—land ownership with a verifiable clear title. If states are
forced to accept a new system, Americans will lose the legal theories that
establish and protect real property rights including marketable title,
prescriptive rights, acquiescence, equitable estoppels, adverse possession
and others. Think about the following:
 Do we really want to force Americans to litigate their property
rights that were documented and maintained for nearly 400 years
until the introduction of MERS?
 If these conclusions are incorrect, why did the title insurance
industry threaten to refuse to insure foreclosures in October
2010?156
 What is the indemnity relationship between lenders and title insurers
today (keeping in mind land title insurance covered risk usually
includes fraud or forgery in the execution of documents in the

155. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Steven Mufson, How The Mortgage Clearinghouse MERS Became A
Villain In the Foreclosure Mess, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR2010123003056.html.
156. David Streitfeld, Company Stops Insuring Title In Chase Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2010). In April 2011, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that MERS was ineligible to use Michigan’s
nonjudicial foreclosure process because MERS did not meet foreclosure by advertisement requirements
and MERS should have filed the foreclosures through Michigan’s judicial foreclosure process. Austin
Kilgore, MERS Ruling Forces HUD to Reforeclose on Mich. REO, National Mortgage News (May 27,
2011). Most major title insurance company underwriters had ceased issuing title insurance to any
properties where MERS closed by advertisement. Consequently, Michigan REO properties in HUD’s
inventory that cannot close due to the inability to obtain title insurance, must be re-foreclosed. Id.
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chain of title (deeds, mortgages, mortgage satisfaction pieces,
etc.)?157
On October 13, 2010, the American Land Title Association (ALTA)
indicated that title insurers are looking to lenders to provide appropriate
indemnities.158 In fact:
ALTA drafted a model indemnity agreement with Fannie and
Freddie that acknowledged the insurer’s obligation to defend its
policyholders in the event of a court challenge to the property’s title,
and required the servicer to reimburse the title insurer for any cost of
defending the title of the purchaser of an REO property.159

Title insurers are aware of the problems and are presumably paying claims
for loss of priority (subordination).
Fast forward, first time buyers purchase their first home with the
“title insurance indemnification from lenders” policy. The title is not
repaired, there may or may not be bona fide purchaser rights which may or
may not be trumped by nemo dat theories. The first time buyers offer to
sell the home; can they indemnify the title insurance company for the
subsequent purchaser?
VII. CONSUMER PROTECTION TIPS
Although foreclosed properties may appear to be a “bargain,” no
American (from the sophisticated investor to the layperson buying a home
for their family to reside) should purchase a foreclosed property owned by
a bank or servicer without first taking the following actions with the advice,
counsel and assistance of a licensed attorney in your state well versed in
real property laws and litigation, boundary disputes, title insurance,
financing and contract law:
1. Do not pay cash for a foreclosure, even if you have cash available.
2. Do not rely on the “warranty” provided by an LLC or an individual
seller unless they provide indemnity in the form of collateral or a security
interest separate from the deed and of value equal to or greater than the
purchase price of the subject property.
3. Obtain an “Owner’s Policy” from a reputable title insurer in
addition to and separate from a “Lender’s Policy.”160 The Owner’s Policy
157. House Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Testimony
of Anne Anastasi (President of the American Land Title Association) on Behalf of the Amercian Land
Title Association, Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage
Servicing (Nov. 18, 2010).
158. Id. at 13.
159. Id.
160. Lenders routinely negotiate “ALTA Endorsements” to title policies. Title insurers want this
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should contain specific endorsements and should protect the buyer against
liens on the subject property. Consult a knowledgeable attorney for the
requisite language and endorsements that must be contained in the Owner’s
Policy.
4. Do not buy a foreclosure with a sequential conveyance without
obtaining a chain of title on the property to be purchased (and on all
adjacent parcels as these may have also been prior foreclosures). If the
chain of title cannot be made available, there may be a problem.161
5. Retain a qualified attorney to render a written opinion as to the
status of title to the foreclosed property, title insurance coverage and any
exceptions to title insurance coverage.
6. Verify that the attorney you retain has proper errors and omissions
(malpractice) insurance coverage that exceeds the value of the property you
are considering purchasing.
7. As an innocent purchaser, know the difference between a deed
obtained by fraud and a deed that has been forged. If a deed is forged, it
cannot pass good title. If a deed is procured by fraud, then it can pass good
title to a bona fide purchaser without notice.162 However, to realize the
property rights may require expensive litigation and a quiet title action may
have a period of time (oftentimes years) to take effect.
The bottom line is that if two properties have equal appeal and all
other factors being equal between purchasing a foreclosure versus a nonforeclosure, it may be preferable to purchase a non-foreclosure unless you
are willing to perform the necessary and substantial due diligence on the
foreclosed property with the assistance of a qualified attorney.
VIII. EPILOGUE
Prior to this article’s publication, several events occurred, including:
1. An audit by San Francisco county officials of approximately four
hundred recent foreclosures revealed almost all had either legal violations
or suspicious documentation—eighty-four percent of the files contained
apparent clear violations of law and two-thirds had at least four violations
or irregularities.163 This audit examined files between January 2009 to

additional insurance to protect their investment from adverse title claims. Oftentimes, title insurers will
spend thousands of dollars on due diligence before lending on large real property loans.
161. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 918 (Mass. 2011). Nemo dat trumps bona fide
purchaser rights. Adam Levitin, Nemo Dat Trumps Bona Fide Purchaser, Credit Slips (Oct. 2011),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/10/nemo-dat-trumps-bona-fide -purchaser.html
162. See Scotch Bonnett Reealty Corp. v. Matthews, 417 Md. 50, 570 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011).
163. Gretchen Morgenson, Audit Uncovers Extensive Flaws in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012).
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November 2011.164
Banks involved in buying and selling foreclosed properties appear to be
aware of potential problems if gaps in the chain of title cloud a
subsequent buyer’s ownership of the home. Lou Pizante, a partner at
Aequitas who worked on the audit, pointed to documents that banks
now require buyers to sign holding the institution harmless if questions
arise about the validity of the foreclosure sale.165

Subsequently, Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi and Congresswoman
Jackie Speier sent a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder asking him to
involve the Justice Department’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force
to examine whether any violations of Federal law occurred in San
Francisco.166
Furthermore, the MERS servicer identification system often does not
produce any information on the beneficial ownership of loans.167 Instead, it
states: “Investor: This investor has chosen not to display their information.
For assistance, please contact the servicer.”168 Does this ambiguous
sentence mean (1) MERS does not know who owns the loan (meaning that
we no longer have a record keeping system to track legally recognized
ownership interests in land back to a root of title) or (2) the owner of the
loan actually refused to be identified (meaning that the MERS system has
abated an important legal incentive to provide public notice of land
ownership interests)?169
2. New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil suit
against various units of JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo,
MERSCORP and MERS over the use of MERS in foreclosures.170 The suit
alleges that the creation and use of MERS has resulted in a wide range of
deceptive and fraudulent foreclosure filings in New York State and the
federal courts, including the use of robo-signers who failed to review the
underlying records as required and served to disguise gaps in chain of

164. Morgenson, supra note 163
165. Id.
166. Press Release, Pelosi, Speier Request Justice Department Examination into Possible Violations
of Federal Law in San Francisco Foreclosures (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.democraticleader.gov/
news/press?id=2496
167. United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, written Testimony of
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis (Dec. 2,
2010).
168. Id.
169. Id. (also stating “We must recognize that our heritage of legal certainty in property rights
created by the interaction of public recording systems and land title statutes is an important national
economic resource that has been depleted by the MERS system”).
170. Yves Smith, Schneiderman Files Civil Fraud Lawsuit Against Three Major Banks for Use of
MERS, Naked Capitalism (Feb. 23, 2012). See also Press Release: A.G. Schneiderman Announces
Major Lawsuit Against Nation’s Largest Banks For Deceptive & Fraudulent Use of Electronic
Mortgage Registry (Feb. 3, 2012) http://www.ag.ny.gov/media center/2012/feb/feb03a 12.html.
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title.171
The complaint alleges that the practices outlined harmed
homeowners and undermined the integrity of the judicial foreclosure
process.172 The lawsuit alleges that employees and agents of various
financial institutions named, acting as “MERS certifying officers” have
repeatedly submitted court documents containing false and misleading
information that made it appear that the foreclosing bank had authority to
do so when it actually did not have this authority.173
This lawsuit further alleges that MERS has effectively eliminated
homeowner’s and the public’s ability to track property transfers through the
traditional public records system and asserts that this information is now
stored only in a private database plagued with inaccuracies and errors over
which MERS and its financial institution members have sole control.174
3. After lengthy negotiations and prior opting out by many state
attorneys’ general, it appears that lenders and the attorneys’ general will
come to an agreement for partial settlement on foreclosure practices in the
amount of $26 billion.175 The settlement had been previously held up by
concerns of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman that the terms
provided too broad of a release for banks for past misdeeds and would
make future investigations difficult; however, Schneiderman was able to
win concessions on this point.176 Releases are expected to be limited to the
foreclosure process and prosecutors and regulators will still have the right
to investigate other possible violations such as the assembly of risky
mortgages into securities that were sold to investors and then went bad
along with insurance and tax fraud.177 Officials will be able to pursue any
allegations of criminal activity.178 Furthermore, Schneiderman’s lawsuit
against MERS will be allowed to go forward.179 Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac (who combined own about half of U.S. mortgages) will not be covered
by any Attorney General settlement.180
171. Smith, supra note 178. See also Complaint filed in Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Kings County entitled The People of the State of New York, by Eric T. Schneiderman v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank N.A, et al. (Feb. 3, 2012).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Dawn Kopecki and David McLaughlin, Foreclosure Accord Said to Ensure Same Terms for
All 50 States, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 14, 2012) http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02
14/foreclosure- accord-said-to- ensure-terms-for-all-50-states.html; See also Nelson D. Schwartz and
Shaila Dewan, States Negotiate $26 Billion Agreement for Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://nytimes.com/2012/02/09/business/states-negotiate-25-billion-deal-forhomeowners.html?
pagewanted=all.
176. Schwartz and Dewan, supra note 175.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Schwartz and Dewan, supra note 175.
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By allowing Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae to purchase
MERS-recorded loans, the federal government has inadvertently
undermined sensible state consumer protection and land title
laws/records.181 MERS now faces uncertain legal costs and, going forward,
Congress should bar Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”) from
becoming more deeply involved with MERS.182 Furthermore, Congress
should not intervene in state’s property laws with a MERS “whitewash”
bill over the basic legal problems associated with MERS, as such a bill is
likely to have unforeseeable and unintended consequences on state laws.183

181. United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, written Testimony of
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis (Dec. 2,
2010).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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